Ed Felton and the gang at Princeton have struck again! This time they've figured out how to defeat the disk encryption schemes built into Vista, MacOS X, and others. The attack works because the values held in RAM don't disappear instantly when a computer is switched off. They decay slowly over a period of seconds, and that can be extended to minutes with a little bit of coaxing. That's long enough to boot up a second OS and read out the contents of memory. After that, it's just a matter of extracting the crypto keys, and the game is over. Awesome work. Read about Cold Boot attacks on Encryption Keys.
If there's a lesson to be re-discovered here, I think it's the amazing way we end up building security systems on what seem to be solid ground (as in "computers forget stuff when you turn them off"), and only when it's too late do we find out that our premise was strong enough for trying to explain computers to someone like your old uncle Hugo, but not strong enough to adequately secure your data.
It appears to me that this attack is still too sophisticated for the average thief who steals laptops in coffee shops, but it's plenty easy for the forensics guy down at the police station.
